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ABSTRACT 
 
Excess Leverage and Productivity Growth in 
Emerging Economies: Is There A Threshold Effect?* 
 
The paper examines the relationship between leverage and growth in a group of emerging 
central and eastern European countries, who are at different levels of financial market 
development. We hypothesize a non-linear relationship in that moderate leverage could 
boost growth while very high leverage could lower it by increasing the likelihood of financial 
distress and bankruptcy. Estimates of a Threshold model confirm the non-linear relationship 
in our sample, after controlling for various firm, industry and financial market characteristics. 
We also endogenously determine a threshold level of leverage beyond which further 
increases in leverage could lower TFP growth. 
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Excess Leverage and Productivity Growth in 
Emerging Economies: Is There A Threshold Effect? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Economists have long recognized that financial conditions in the private sector could 
have a powerful effect on macroeconomic outcomes. Increases in leverage can lead to 
greater probability of default, and in turn higher costs of external financing. This 
could lower investment, cash flow and therefore output (Kyotaki and Moore, 1997). 
Increases in corporate leverage could also induce severe slowdowns by 
amplifying/propagating initial adverse shocks (e.g., demand) on the real economy 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Despite the importance of this question, especially in 
the current economic climate, we are not aware of any study that explores the link 
between corporate leverage and the wider economy which we propose. 
Corporate leverage decisions are among the most important decisions made 
by firm executives. The current economic crisis has however highlighted the risks of 
global boom-bust cycles driven by lending, which in turn raises the need to 
understand the link between leverage decisions and the wider economy. Since 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), research has focused on understanding/analysing 
corporate financial choices and policies around the world, especially in the US. This 
literature highlights the firm, market and industry characteristics determining 
optimal leverage and also its dynamic adjustment process in case of a departure from 
the optimal (e.g., Driffield and Pal, 2010). A parallel literature on financial 
institutions has also paid attention to different aspects of problem loans and cost 
inefficiency (e.g., see Berger and Humphrey 1992; Bonin et al. 2005).  While there 
is limited literature on the relationship between leverage and firm 
value/performance (e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Berger and di Patti 2006; 
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Driffield, Mahambare and Pal, 2007), there is very little, if at all, understanding as to 
how departure from optimal leverage could affect productivity growth, especially for 
emerging economies with weak financial institutions.  
In an attempt to bridge this gap in the literature we argue that higher leverage 
may reduce the agency costs of outside equity, and increase firm value (and 
efficiency) by encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1995).1 Thus, higher leverage is likely to be associated with 
higher total factor productivity (TFP) growth. We also highlight the non-linear 
aspect of this relationship: while moderate leverage could undoubtedly boost TFP 
and therefore the level of output, very high leverage may be responsible for an 
economy’s vulnerability to unexpected shortfalls in demand and mistakes. This is 
because excessive leverage could create excess capacity and lead to financial distress 
and even bankruptcy in response to adverse shocks (Greenspan, 2002). Given that 
the sample countries are at different stages of financial market development, the 
likelihood of excess leverage and also its effect on TFP growth may vary across the 
sample countries, even after controlling for various firm and industry level 
characteristics. These are open empirical questions that we explore in the paper. 
The analysis is based primarily (see section 2) on firm-level Orbis data from a 
group of central and eastern European (CEE) transition countries. This sample is 
interesting for several reasons. Even after more than a decade of reform, there is a 
growing feeling that the reforms have failed to spur adequately the development of 
corporate financing opportunities in the central and eastern European (CEE) 
countries. Unlike much of the literature for developed countries (e.g., see Fischer, et 
al, 1989; Goldstein, Ju and Leland 2001; Strebulaev 2007), the literature on capital 
structure for developing and transition countries has highlighted the importance of 
                                                 
1 There can also be reverse causation. For example, more efficient firms may choose lower equity ratios (i.e., higher 
debt) than others, all else equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of financial distress and 
bankruptcy (Berger and di Patti, 2006). See further discussion in section 3. 
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excess leverage (e.g., see Driffield and Pal, 2010). An important aspect of our 
analysis has been to take account of the nature of financial markets development in 
the sample because weaknesses in financial sector operations and management have 
been a major factor contributing to the current financial crisis across the globe. Our 
analysis in this respect has been facilitated by the availability of the Financial Sector 
Development Indicators or FSDI for short (see World Bank 2006).2 Among various 
available indices, we particularly focus on banking efficiency and share of market 
capital to gross domestic product, both of which tend to play an important role in 
our analysis (see further discussion in section 2.4). 
Following the well-developed literature on corporate leverage and its 
dynamic adjustment (e.g., see Booth et al. 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006), we 
start our analysis with the conventional approach of identifying firms with leverage in 
excess of its optimal level (instrumented by the fitted values of leverage). This 
analysis highlights the incidence of excess leverage among sample firms with access to 
loans and also that the indices of financial market development, namely, low bank 
efficiency and limited market capitalization significantly contribute to the likelihood 
of excess leverage, after controlling for other firm and industry-level factors. Note, 
however, that the conventional regression method does not allow us to endogenously 
determine the particular leverage level that may harm total factor productivity 
growth. Therefore, we follow Hansen (2000) to endogenously determine a threshold 
level of leverage beyond which leverage has an adverse effect on productivity growth. 
Indeed, there is some evidence from the threshold analysis that TFP growth increases 
with leverage only up to a certain point. However, beyond a critical level, greater 
leverage lowers TFP growth, even after controlling for various firm-level and 
institutional characteristics. Results of our analysis also highlight the beneficial role of 
greater financial market development, as signified by the positive effects of greater 
                                                 
2 See further discussion in section 2. 
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bank efficiency and market capitalization on TFP growth. These results hold 
irrespective of the choice of leverage measures and also various sub-samples.  
A better understanding of the causes and implications of capital structure 
imbalances for TFP growth is important, especially in the wake of the current credit 
crunch and the subsequent turmoil in many countries around the globe. Results of 
our analysis may provide important insights into the problem and also implications 
for future deleveraging policies. Our analysis has already been adapted in the 
Transition Report (see EBRD 2009, P. 69-70), highlighting its relevance for policy 
makers. 
The analysis is developed in stages. Section 2 describes the data while section 
3 explains the threshold model and the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.   
 
 
2. Data Description 
Data used for the analysis is primarily taken from Orbis, a rich firm-level dataset, 
which is provided by Bureau van Dijk electronic publishing. Firm-level Orbis data has 
been supplemented by country-level data obtained from the EBRD and the World 
Bank. The World Bank (2006) has developed a range of indices to measure size, 
efficiency and stability of the banking sector as well as the equity markets for a cross 
section of countries, including the countries of our interest, for the period 2001-
2005. These are commonly known as the Financial Services Development Indices or 
FSDI in short.  
Our sample consists of manufacturing firms from twelve transition countries, 
namely, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine over the period 2001-2005. Choice of 
the sample period has been dictated by the fact that FSDI data is available only for this 
period. This has been a period of steady growth of domestic credit (as a share of 
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GDP) in the region, which stabilized around 2005 for most of the sample countries 
(see Figure 1). The total number of observations for the period 2001-2005 is 
summarized in Table 1 for each sample country. 
 
2.1. Leverage measures 
We use different measures of leverage, generally dictated by the availability of 
relevant information. First, we use the ratio of total debt (short and long-term debt) 
to total assets (abbreviated as TDTA). As an alternative, we use the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets (abbreviated as TLTA), which is available for a larger 
proportion of sample firms. Note however that a large proportion of firms do not use 
any debt finance; thus the sample size is smaller when we use TDTA. While we do 
not observe market value of equity, there is information on book value of equity; 
there are however many missing observations, thus rendering the use of this rather 
problematic.  
 Table 1 shows the average leverages between 2001 and 2005 for twelve 
sample countries, using the leverage measures described above for all firms and also 
for non-zero debt firms. There are some firms in each of these sample countries for 
which no information on debt was available. Further, given limited use of external 
finance in CEE countries, there is a significant proportion of firms with zero debt in 
our sample,3 notably in Romania. This reflects the fact that many firms still do not 
have access to debt markets in these economies and instead make heavy use of 
internal finance, trade credit and other kinds of liabilities.  
 Among all firms, the average ratio of total liabilities to total assets ranges 
between 0.34 (Slovenia) and 0.60 (Slovakia). The range for average debt ratio is 
however much narrower, namely between 0.02 (Romania) and 0.19 (Czech 
                                                 
3 Note also that there are a number of cases when there was very little data for total debt in the sample countries, 
especially, Croatia and Slovenia (see Table 1). 
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Republic). Since a significant proportion of firms in each of these countries do not 
have access to any debt, it may be pertinent to focus on indebted firms (i.e., those 
with some non-zero debt) only. The average debt ratio goes up somewhat when we 
consider the subsample of firms with non-zero debt. So we need to be cautious about 
choosing between samples (all firms versus non-zero debt firms) while 
analyzing/interpreting debt ratios.4  
Table 2 shows debt ratio percentiles and the distribution of average debt ratios 
by firm size (proxied by total assets). Clearly, the debt ratios of firms in the lowest 
quartile are significantly lower from those in the top 5-10% of the distribution in 
most sample countries. In fact the debt ratio exceeds 1 for the top 1% firms in 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Russia. While a large proportion of firms in the 
sample countries are deprived of loans, there is evidence that some firms tend to have 
access to too much loans. Second, while the larger firms tend to have higher leverage 
in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, the opposite 
holds for the other sample countries. The correlation between firm size (measured by 
log of total assets) and leverage, as shown in Table 2, suggests a significant positive 
correlation for Croatia, Serbia and Slovakia while it is significantly negative for 
Poland, Russia and Ukraine; the correlation coefficient however remains insignificant 
for other sample countries.  
 
2.2. Optimal leverage 
In an attempt to understand the nature and extent of excess leverage, if any, we start 
with the conventional literature (e.g., see Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Driffield and 
Pal  2010) to determine the optimal leverage Lit
* (alternatively labeled as capital 
structure) of firms in individual countries. This allows us to have an estimate of the 
                                                 
4 We have also experimented with alternative leverage measures, namely, debt and liability ratio net of cash-flow, 
which yielded rather comparable results to those presented here. 
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leverage gap, i.e., the deviation of actual leverage from its optimal level (see section 
2.3). 
 If leverage levels are relatively stable over time, then a simple average of the 
fitted values for each firm across time may provide the best estimate of optimal 
leverage. However, if the data are more volatile (as in our case), and firms are 
responding to changes in the explanatory variables, or to other shocks (e.g., ongoing 
reforms), then allowing the optimal level to vary year to year, and using the fitted 
values on an annual basis is more appropriate, and this is what we do. Once one 
allows for this, the best estimate of “optimal leverage” is conventionally taken to be 
the fitted value5 derived from the following equation estimated individually for each 
country: 
Leverageit = β0 + β1 log(assets)it-1 + β2 Ageit-1 +  β3 (fixed assets/total 
assets)it-1 + β4 (Intangible Fixed Assets/Total Asset)it-1 + β5 (EBIT/Total 
Assets)it-1 +  β6  (shareholder’s funds/total asset) it-1 + β7 (growth of total 
assets) it-1 + β8 inflation it-1 + β9 Industry Median Leverage t-1+  νi + uit (1)6 
 
where i=1, 2,…, N refers to the i-th firm in period t=1, 2,…, T in a given country. 
νi is the firm-specific fixed effects while uit refers to random errors independently 
and identically distributed. Definitions of these variables are provided in a note to 
Table 5. We use panel data fixed effects models to estimate the leverage equation 
(1), using both debt and liability ratios as alternative measures of leverage. Choice of 
fixed effects as opposed to random effects has been dictated by the sample data. 
Choice of the explanatory variables has been guided by the existing literature (e.g., 
see Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Frank and Goyal, 2009; 
Driffield and Pal 2010) and also data availability; e.g., we were unable to calculate 
                                                 
5 Later in the paper, we endogenously determine the optimal leverage, using a threshold model. 
6 EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes. 
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market to book ratio and therefore replace it by shareholders’ funds as a share of total 
assets. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one period. We experiment with 
various specifications and show the estimates of debt and liability ratios for the best 
fitted models in Appendix Table A1.7 
 Clearly these estimates are somewhat different for debt and liability ratios and 
inter-country variation is also pronounced in these estimates. In general, firm size, 
intangible fixed assets, profitability and shareholders’ funds tend to be generally 
significant, although the size and sign of these coefficients vary.  
 
2.3. Deviation from optimal leverage 
We estimate equation (1) country by country and use the predicted values of 
leverage ratios as the optimal target leverage Lit
* of the i-th firm in year t.  Estimation 
of the optimal leverage Lit
* allows us to compute the deviation of the actual leverage 
from the corresponding optimal as (Lit-Lit
*). In order to understand the pattern of 
imbalance in corporate leverage, we distinguish between firms with a leverage deficit 
(i.e., for which the actual debt or liability ratio is less than their corresponding 
target) and those with excess leverage (i.e., for which the actual debt or liability ratio 
exceeds the corresponding optimal level). No sample firm had exactly the optimal 
leverage (debt or liability). Accordingly, we construct the following binary variable:  
EXCESSit = 1 if the i-th firm has excess leverage in year t. 
     = 0 if the i-th firm has a leverage deficit in year t (since no firm has optimal 
leverage in our sample) 
 
Depending on the alternative measures of leverage, we generate two variables, 
namely, the “excess debt ratio” (EXCESSTD) and the “excess liability ratio” 
                                                 
7 We also used alternative leverage indices, namely, net debt and net liability ratios,  as discussed in section 2.1; we find 
that these alternative estimates are rather similar to the ones shown in Table A1. These estimates would be available on 
request. 
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(EXCESSTL).  Table 3 summarizes the proportion of firms with excess leverage and 
the corresponding average gap for firms with excess leverage. The analysis is done 
only for firms with some positive debt. Clearly a significant majority of firms in the 
sample countries tend to have excess leverage and this transition experience contrasts 
with much of the existing capital structure literature for developed countries (also 
see Driffield and Pal, 2010). 
It is interesting to compare the frequency of firms with excess leverage in the 
sample CEE countries with those available for the East Asian Economies. Clearly, 
countries from east Asia (vis-a-vis more developed OECD countries) are more 
comparable to CEE countries:  (i) bank-based finance dominates in both east Asia and 
CEE countries; (ii) indices of financial market developments are more comparable 
too. Clearly the proportions of firms with excess leverage for all the CEE sample 
countries are higher than those for the east Asian countries (see Appendix Table A2) 
studied by Driffield and Pal (2010), thus inducing us to examine the factors 
determining the likelihood of excess leverage in the CEE region.  
 
 
2.4. Financial institutions and  excess leverage  
Persistence of deviations from optimal leverage levels highlights the aspects of capital 
market imperfections, which may prevent an instantaneous adjustment of the actual 
leverage to the desired level (for example, see Fisher Heinkel and Zechner, 1989; 
Goldstein, Ju and Leland, 2001; Strebulaev, 2007). While much of the transition 
literature focuses on firm-level characteristics in understanding capital structure 
dynamics, we argue that persistence of excess leverage could be a sign of regulatory 
weaknesses in debt issuance, management and recovery. Even allowing for the fact 
that a high proportion of firms in the sample countries do not have any bank loans, it 
is perhaps surprising to find that the incidence of excess leverage among non-zero 
10 
 
  
debt firms in many CEE countries is higher than those in the worst affected countries 
in East Asia (Driffield and Pal, 2010). Accordingly, we explore the role of financial 
institutional indices, ceteris paribus, on the presence of excess leverage in the sample 
countries. 
Table 4 summarizes the average characteristics of available financial and legal 
indices in the region, prepared using information from the EBRD, the World Bank 
FSDI indices and la Porta et al. (1998). Among others, the Table includes measures 
of size, efficiency and stability of the banking sector (available from World Bank), 
market capitalization to GDP, share of foreign banks (available from EBRD), and the 
quality of creditors’ rights (available from la Porta et al. ,1998).  Share of market 
capitalization to GDP is generally limited in most of the sample countries, especially, 
in  Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia and Serbia. Firms’ external financing opportunities thus 
depend crucially on the size and efficiency of the banking sector though the 
experience varies widely among the sample countries. In particular, Romania not 
only have the smallest banking sector, but efficiency of the banking sector is also the 
lowest in our sample. It is however noteworthy that compared to Romania, scores 
for average creditors’ rights are much higher in Serbia or Ukraine, which may 
facilitate the growth of banking sector. The other important observation relates to 
the predominance of foreign banks in countries like Poland, Romania or Hungary as 
opposed to Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine or Russia.  
Table 5 summarizes the mean comparison of selected characteristics including 
firm size (log of total assets), age, foreign ownership, fixed assets, intangible fixed 
assets, earnings ratio (index of profitability), and the rate of CPI inflation. We also 
include some characteristics of financial institutions in our analysis on the ground that 
weaknesses in financial sector have been closely linked to the current financial and 
economic crisis. Note however that these financial institutional indices are closely 
correlated; our analysis thus includes measures of bank efficiency and market 
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capitalization (as a share of GDP), as these indices have highest correlations with 
measures of excess leverage.  On average, smaller firms (by total assets), younger 
firms and firms with more fixed assets are significantly more likely to have excess 
leverage. Firms from countries with higher inflation are also more likely to have 
excess leverage.  In terms of financial institutions, sample firms are significantly more 
likely to have excess leverage, on average, if they come from countries with lower 
bank efficiency, lower market capitalization rate. 
Finally, we estimate a conditional fixed effects logit model to formally 
determine the likelihood of having excess leverage (EXCESSTD and EXCESSTL) in 
terms of various firm, industry and country level characteristics in our sample. We 
choose fixed rather than random effects model to determine the likelihood of excess 
leverage because the former reduces the potential endogeneity bias arising from 
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in the data. Among the firm-level 
characteristics, we include firm size (log of total assets), age (in years), share of fixed 
assets in total assets (FATA), share of intangible assets in total assets (IFATA) and 
profitability (EBIT as a share of total assets). In addition, we include country inflation 
rate, efficiency of the banking sector (BANKEFF) and also the ratio of market 
capitalization to GDP (MKTGDP) to control for country-level variations in these 
respects. Table 6 shows the conditional fixed effects logit estimates of excess debt 
(EXCESSTD) and excess liability (EXCESSTL) ratios for the pooled panel data. 
Naturally, the time invariant variables are dropped from the logit fixed effects 
estimates. Two sets of estimates are shown here and these estimates correspond to 
the choice of sample: (a) all firms and (b) non-zero debt firms. In line with Table 5, 
these estimates establish the significant role of institutions on the presence and 
persistence of excess leverage, after controlling for other covariates, in our sample. 
While greater inflation enhances the probability of excess leverage, higher efficiency 
of the banking sector and higher market capitalization to GDP are generally 
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associated with a lower probability of firms having excess leverage (note however 
that the effect of market capitalization is insignificant in determining EXCESSTD 
among non-zero debt firms). Clearly, a more efficient banking sector is able to 
screen out bad loans while a greater degree of market capitalization not only offers an 
alternative source of external finance, but could also contribute to improved 
corporate governance practices. There is thus evidence that the incidence of excess 
leverage among sample firms is linked to weaker financial institutions in our sample 
of CEE countries. 
 
 
3. Implications of Excess Leverage for TFP Growth  
The analysis so far has shown that while access to loans is limited for a significant 
proportion of firms in our sample, excess leverage is common among firms with 
some positive loans. It has also been established that the presence and persistence of 
excess leverage among sample firms is closely related to the quality of financial 
markets and institutions. The final task in this paper is to examine the effect of excess 
leverage, if any, on firm performance measured by total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth. Our central hypothesis is that while moderate levels of debt can stimulate 
TFP growth, through providing finance for new technology, innovation or new 
capacity, after a given threshold, this debt becomes a drag on performance, as the 
firm has to focus on cash flow in order to service the debt, rather than continued 
improvements in productivity. As discussed above, firms with excess debt are 
extremely vulnerable to unexpected adverse demand shocks.  
 In order to test this hypothesis one could possibly use a fixed-effects model to 
regress total factor productivity growth on excess leverage and its non-linear terms, 
after controlling for other covariates. But this may raise questions, especially because 
the conventional method does not allow us to endogenously determine the particular 
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leverage level that may harm total factor productivity growth. All we could do is to 
experiment with different leverage levels and try to identify some leverage that could 
harm productivity growth. Accordingly, we employ the threshold regression analysis 
of Hansen (2004) to the data. This identifies the threshold levels of leverage beyond 
which further increases in leverage could lower total factor productivity growth. We 
begin by examining this in the aggregate, and subsequently move on to some 
comparisons across countries, and across different types of firms.  
 
 
3. Leverage and Total Factor Productivity 
Estimates of TFP are generated using the well understood Levinsohn-Petrin method 
(a la Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Given that we were able to find industry-level 
price deflators for only 9 out of 12 of the sample countries, this TFP measure could 
be constructed for these 9 countries only, thus excluding firms from Croatia, 
Romania and Serbia from our original sample analyzed in section 2.  
Figure 2 plots average TFP growth for these nine countries during 2001-
2005. Clearly, TFP growth rate has been rather stable in most countries with the 
exception of Hungary and Slovenia during the sample period 2001-2005. 
 
3.2. An Endogenous Threshold Model 
The threshold model is particularly relevant to test our central hypothesis, as it 
endogenously determines the existence and significance of one or more leverage 
thresholds (and the corresponding confidence intervals), which in turn allows us to 
assess the growth effects of leverage as a nonlinear process. Depending on whether 
the leverage is less than, equal to or greater than the threshold, we could obtain 
marginal effects associated with different bands of leverage in the model and also test 
whether the marginal effects are significantly different. 
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Let us start with the simplest threshold model for total factor productivity 
growth of the i-th firm for the period [t, t+1] as follows: 
ΔTFPit+1 = α1 Lit + β’Xit+νit  if  Lit ≤γ    (3a) 
 ΔTFPit+1 = α2 Lit + β’Xit+νit  if  Lit >γ    (3b) 
Combining (3a) and (3b), we could write: 
 ΔTFPit+1 = β’Xit+α1 Lit I(Lit ≤γ) + α2 Lit I(Lit >γ)+νit  (4)  
where Lit is the initial value of leverage (i.e., debt or liability ratio).  I(.) represents 
an indicator function, indicating whether leverage measure of the i-th firm at time t is 
less than equal to or greater than a threshold parameter  ;   is the endogenous 
threshold value to be estimated from the model (please see discussion in section 
below). The errors νit are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with 
mean zero and finite variance. Depending on whether the actual leverage is 
smaller/equal to or larger than the threshold value ( ) to be estimated, observations 
are divided into two “regimes” where the regimes are distinguished by differing 
regression slopes, 1 and 2 .  
Let Sn(β,α( )) represent the sum of squared errors for equation (4), where n 
is the sample size. Given that the parameters α depend on the threshold parameters 
 , we denote them by α( )). Because of this dependence, S(.) is not linear in the 
parameters but rather a step function where steps appear at some distinct values of 
the threshold variable  .  But conditional on a given threshold value, say  = 0, S(.) 
is linear in β and α. Accordingly,  S(β,α( 0)) can be minimised to yield the 
conditional OLS estimates βˆ( 0) and αˆ( 0). Among all possible leverage values, 
the estimate of the threshold corresponds to that value of α, which minimises the 
sum of squared errors S(β,α( 0)) for  =
0
. Following Girma (2005), this 
minimisation problem is solved by a grid search over 393 leverage quantiles {1.00%, 
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1.25%, 1.50%, …, 98.75%, 99%}. Once the sample splitting value of   is 
identified, the estimates of the slope parameters are readily available. 
If a threshold effect is identified, i.e.., α1≠α2, it is important to form a 
confidence interval for the particular threshold value   in this context. This 
necessitates us to test the following null hypothesis:  
Ho : γ= γ0 
Under normality, the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic is routinely used in standard 
econometric applications to test for particular parametric values. But Hansen (2000) 
shows that LRn(γ) does not have a standard chi-square distribution in the threshold 
model. The correct distribution function and the appropriate asymptotic critical 
values need to be obtained from the bootstrapped standard errors (see Girma 2005 
for further details). 
Suppose that the two confidence limits of the threshold   are given 
respectively by  1 (lower) and  2 (upper). This allows us to define three sets of 
leverage variables as follows. Using debt ratio (TDTA) as the particular leverage 
measure, we generate tdta- (i.e., tdta≤ 1),  tdta= (i.e.,  1<tdta≤ 2) and tdta+ 
(i.e., tdta>  2); similarly using the liability ratio as an alternative leverage measure, 
we generate tlta- (i.e., tlta≤ 1), tlta= (i.e.,  1<tlta≤ 2) and tlta+ (i.e., tlta> 2). 
Accordingly, equation (4) is modified as follows: 
ΔTFPit+1 = α1 Lit I(Lit ≤γ1) + α2 Lit I( 1<Lit ≤ 2) +α3 Lit I(Lit > 2)+ β’Xit +νit 
           (5)  
In addition to different bands of leverage as shown in equation (5), we include initial 
values of a number of other control variables Xit, namely, firm size (SME), age 
(Young), share of intangible assets (IFATA), ownership (foreign) and also some 
institutional characteristics, namely, efficiency of the banking sector and also the 
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extent of market capitalization to GDP.8 This is because the extent to which debt will 
act to restrict productivity growth is expected to vary with the size/efficiency of the 
financial market. The more effective the market, the less likely moral hazard would 
lead to excess leverage, and the lower the level of debt the firms may accrue before 
the servicing the debt acts as a constraint. Xit-1 also includes the initial value of TFP as 
a control variable; significance of initial TFP will highlight the importance of Barro’s 
conditional convergence hypothesis. 
 The final step in this estimation strategy is to establish the asymptotic 
distribution of the slope coefficients. Although these parameters depend on the 
estimated threshold limits  1 and  2, Hansen (2000) demonstrates that this 
dependence is not of first-order asymptotic importance. Consequently, the usual 
distribution theory (i.e. asymptotically normal) can be applied to the estimated slope 
coefficients so that one could use the asymptotic p-values to test whether there is a 
significant threshold effect, i.e., if α1= α2= α3=0 ; rejection of the null hypothesis 
would confirm the presence of a significant threshold effect. 9 
  
3.3. Threshold estimates 
Threshold estimates for TFP growth are summarized in Table 7 and Table 8 for all 
firms and non-zero debt firms respectively. We first estimate the 95% confidence 
interval for the threshold parameter  . The confidence interval varies somewhat for 
debt and liability ratios while they tend to be robust irrespective of the choice of the 
sample (all firms versus non-zero debt firms).  
Initial value of TFP is insignificant; thus there is no evidence of convergence in 
our sample. However all three leverage terms relating to different bands of the 
leverage thresholds are statistically significant and this holds irrespective of the choice 
                                                 
8 See note to Table 6 for variable definitions. 
9 This procedure is explained in detail in Henry et al. (2003) and Girma (2005).   
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of the leverage measure, debt or liability ratio. There is thus evidence that, after 
controlling for all other factors, moderate leverage (leverage≤ 2) could boost TFP 
growth, while excessive leverage (leverage> 2) lowers it. It is also evident that the 
marginal effect of an increase in leverage is significantly different for different bands 
of leverage and it decreases as we move from the lower leverage band to the higher 
one. In particular, these estimates suggest that a debt or liability ratio of around 40% 
or higher would lower TFP growth in our sample.  
 Among other results, the role of institutional factors is worth highlighting 
here. In particular, higher efficiency of the banking sector and higher market 
capitalization are both associated with higher TFP growth, thus confirming the 
beneficial role of institutions on long-run economic growth. The effect of intangible 
assets however turns out to be negative. While often intangible assets are taken to be 
a measure of R&D, they also include overvalued goodwill and patents (which may 
correspond to the expected future value of intangible assets). Thus it is not unusual 
for intangible assets to have a negative effect on TFP growth. 
 Given the possibility of reverse causation (i.e., more efficient firms may 
choose lower equity ratios and hence higher debt than others), it is also important to 
test the robustness of our estimates for more/less efficient firms. In the absence of 
any better indicator, we consider profitability as an index of efficiency and classify 
firms according to (a) profit margin and (b) return on capital. In the light of our 
sample distribution, we consider two benchmark values for (a) and (b): (1) whether 
the firm has positive profit or rate of return on capital (ROCE) and (2) whether the 
firm has profit margin or ROCE in excess of the median values (which are about 0.04 
for both these variables in our sample). Threshold estimates for non-zero debt firms 
for “profitable” and “non-profitable” firms are shown in Table 9. Naturally, the 
estimated threshold parameters are somewhat different, but they are well in line with 
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the previous estimates for the pooled sample. As before, these estimates confirm the 
significant adverse effect of excessive leverage (beyond the upper threshold) on TFP 
growth in our sample. The contrast between profitable and non-profitable firms is 
also interesting. First, the upper threshold value of leverage is higher for more 
profitable firms. Second, the marginal adverse effects of excess leverage on TFP 
growth are also different between these two groups of firms. The absolute marginal 
effect of excessive leverage (beyond the upper threshold) is significantly higher for 
non-profitable firms, thus suggesting that effects of excess leverage are particularly 
bad for non-profitable firms.  
Further robustness checks are done by splitting the sample by median firm size 
(defined by total assets) and median intangible assets ratio. In each case, we estimate 
the threshold model for firms in the upper half of the distribution of each of these 
variables. Threshold effects for each case are summarized in Appendix Table A3, 
which highlights the robustness of our results. The threshold estimates are quite 
stable across the various samples classified by firm size and intangible assets. 
Finally, we use the leverage threshold estimates to calculate the percentage of 
firms above the upper threshold for each sample country. In this respect, we 
particularly focus on non-zero debt firms, distinguishing profitable firms (those with 
above median profit margin) from others. Results of our analysis are summarized in 
Table 10. Clearly, a significant proportion of all non-zero debt firms in many sample 
countries tend to have debt ratios in excess of the upper threshold limits; the 
proportion is significantly less when we consider more profitable non-zero debt 
firms. Furthermore, excess leverage is also common among non-profitable firms in 
most sample countries, with the exception of Slovenia. This is further highlighted in 
the pronounced inter-country variation: the proportion of firms with excessive 
leverage is zero in Slovenia while it is the highest in Russia. Results from our analysis 
thus highlight the aspect of inefficient allocation of credit and also its adverse effects 
19 
 
  
on TFP growth, especially among non-profitable firms. 
  The upshot of our analysis is that unlike the conventional analysis one is able 
to endogenously determine the 95% confidence interval for the leverage threshold . 
This in turn allows us to test for the non-linearity in the relationship between 
leverage and TFP growth, if any. While moderate leverage could boost TFP growth, 
excessive leverage beyond the upper threshold limit would significantly lower TFP 
growth and this result is robust across various subsamples considered. The estimated 
upper leverage limit is about 40% irrespective of the leverage measure used. This is a 
significant finding, especially in an economic climate where excessive corporate 
leverage has been blamed for the current credit crunch. Our analysis allows the data 
to identify the safe threshold limit of leverage for the sample countries, which could 
guarantee significantly positive TFP growth. Our results have already been adapted in 
the Transition Report (EBRD 2009, p. 69-70), highlighting the relevance of the 
threshold model for policy making. 
 
3.4. Role of Financial Institutions  
Clearly the sample countries are heterogeneous in terms of efficiency of financial 
markets and institutions and, among various indices, our analysis has particularly 
highlighted the significant role of bank efficiency and market capitalization, not only 
on the likelihood of excess leverage (e.g., see Table 6), but also on total factor 
productivity growth (Tables 7-9). In order to explore the possible role of selected 
indices of financial institutions further, we now estimate the threshold model for 
individual countries, each characterized by given efficiency of financial institutions. 
Table 11 summarizes the threshold estimates for five of the nine sample countries 
namely Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine. We were unable to obtain 
estimates for the remaining countries, as the grid search process failed to identify the 
sample-splitting value of the threshold. We do not show the full set of estimates for 
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brevity, but they are available on request.  
Our central results remain unchanged in that moderate leverage continues to 
have a positive impact on TFP growth while high leverage (beyond the upper 
threshold limit) affects TFP growth negatively and the result holds for all five 
countries. Note, however, that the leverage thresholds tend to vary among these 
five countries: Serbia has the lowest (0.288) while Russia has the highest (0.514) 
leverage threshold in our sample. Given that these country-specific estimates are 
available only for 5 countries, it is hard to derive a definite relationship between 
financial institutions, as proxied by bank efficiency and market capitalization rate, and 
the estimated upper leverage threshold (above which TFP growth is affected 
negatively). As a rule of thumb, we calculate the correlation between the country-
specific threshold levels on the one hand and bank efficiency and market capitalization 
on the other for the 5 countries included in Table 11. While the correlation 
coefficients between bank efficiency and leverage threshold are negative (-0.15 and -
0.26 respectively for debt ratio and liability ratio), those between market 
capitalization and the threshold level turn out to be positive (0.85 and 0.81 
respectively for debt and liability ratios) for non-zero debt firms in our sample. These 
simple correlation coefficients perhaps highlight several, possibly conflicting, 
channels affecting the relationship between selected indices of financial markets and 
the estimated leverage threshold.10  In particular, upper leverage threshold is lower 
among firms from countries with greater bank efficiency, suggesting the beneficial 
role banks can play to screen and monitor good loans so as to avoid the kind of 
financial crisis that we experienced recently. We hope future research will shed 
further light in this respect. 
                                                 
10 For example, greater market efficiency means that loans are channeled to the "right" firms, i.e. those with positive 
NPV projects that can sustain higher debt levels without running into difficulties (positive impact on upper threshold). 
In contrast, investors (be it banks or shareholders) in more efficient markets may start imposing discipline earlier, thus 
resulting in a negative impact on upper threshold (e.g., see ‘Bad Management hypothesis’ in Berger et al., 1997).  
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4. CONCLUSION 
The sizeable literature on capital structure and its dynamics in developed countries 
identifies the possible factors causing under-levering of firms and ways to adjust it. It 
is however common among firms in many developing and transition economies to 
maintain excess leverage though we know very little about the nature and 
implications of excess leverage for TFP growth. This paper is an attempt to bridge 
this gap in the literature, primarily using Orbis firm-level panel data from a group of 
CEE emerging economies. This allows us to understand the way corporate financial 
behavior could affect the wider economy. 
We start with an analysis of excess leverage conventionally defined as the 
deviation of actual leverage from an optimal level derived from the fitted leverage 
values of a fixed-effects model. This analysis highlights that a significant proportion of 
firms do not have access to any bank loans while excess leverage is common among 
indebted firms and also that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of firms being over-
levered is closely linked to low bank efficiency and market capitalization.  
The central task of the paper is to test the hypothesis that moderate leverage 
could boost productivity growth while very high leverage could lead to financial 
distress and even bankruptcy in response to adverse shocks and could thus lower 
productivity growth. In this respect, we use a threshold model (a la Hansen, 2000) to 
endogenously determine the presence and significance of threshold effects of leverage 
on TFP growth. Threshold estimates identify an upper threshold limit (about 40% of 
total assets) beyond which further increases in leverage could adversely affect TFP 
growth in the sample. Results are robust and hold not only in the full sample, but 
also in various subsamples including large firms, firms with more intangible assets as 
well as more profitable firms. Note however that the adverse effects of excessive 
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leverage are particularly high for non-profitable firms. There is also suggestion that 
the leverage thresholds vary across the sample countries at different levels of financial 
development, thus highlighting the possible role of financial institutions on 
productivity growth.  
 Evidence of excess leverage reflects aspects of microeconomic inefficiencies in 
credit allocation among firms in the sample countries, especially those with weaker 
financial markets and institutions. While it is essential for firms to deleverage under 
the circumstances, one also needs to be cautious so that ‘virtuous’ firms are not 
starved of essential credit.  
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Table 1: Cross-country variation in leverages 2001-2005  
 
    
All firms  
Non-zero debt 
firms 
 
   Obs. With 
missing 
debt info  TLTA  TDTA  
 
TLTA 
TDTA 
Country 
Firms Total 
Obs. 
Obs. With 
zero debt 
(%) 
(%)  
Mean SD Mean SD 
 
Mean 
Mean 
Bulgaria 207 1035 18.2  (17.7) 0.59 0.94 0.18 0.33 0.62 0.24 
Croatia 129 645 7.3  (86.7) 0.39 0.22 0.06 0.13 0.37 0.13 
Czech  68 340 12.6  (28.8) 0.52 0.66 0.19 0.32 0.58 0.23 
Hungary 22 110 16.4  (43.6) 0.40 0.21 0.09 0.12 0.43 0.13 
Latvia 26 130 10.8  (31.5) 0.49 0.53 0.18 0.20 0.55 0.22 
Poland 162 810 25.3  (39.1) 0.53 0.35 0.10 0.13 0.56 0.16 
Romania 51 255 78.4  (6.3) 0.45 0.32 0.02 0.06 0.47 0.11 
Russia 415 2075 11.6  (31.6) 0.42 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.69 0.24 
Serbia 289 1445 13.7  (2.5) 0.37 0.23 0.12 0.15 0.39 0.14 
Slovakia 119 595 6.9  (20.0) 0.60 1.57 0.12 0.13 0.59 0.13 
Slovenia 65 325 0.9  (90.8) 0.34 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.40 0.07 
Ukraine 159 795 17.  (1.1) 0.42 0.26 0.13 0.16 0.45 0.15 
Note: TL/TA is the total liability as a share of total assets while TD/TA is total debt (both short and long-run) to total assets.  
Source: Authors’ own calculation using Orbis data. 
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Table 2: Distribution of debt ratio among  firms with positive debt, 2001-2005  
 Leverage percentiles Average leverage by size (by total assets) 
Country 
25% 50% 
75% 90% 95% 
99% Small & medium 
firms 
Large Correlation 
(size, leverage) 
Bulgaria 0.05 0.13 0.28 0.53 0.70 1.55 0.22 0.25 -0.0213 
Croatia 0.013 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.42 0.83 0.06 0.18 0.304* 
Czech Republic 0.045 0.14 0.27 0.40 0.97 2.19 0.20 0.25 0.013 
Hungary 0.009 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.65 0.13 0.13 -0.054 
Latvia 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.52 0.71 0.82 0.27 0.19 -0.163 
Poland 0.06 0.13 0.23 0.36 0.44 0.68 0.18 0.15 -0.147* 
Romania 0.015 0.07 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.70 0.09 0.12 0.163 
Russia 0.06 0.15 0.33 0.51 0.61 1.3 0.27 0.19 -0.19* 
Serbia 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.35 0.44 0.65 0.12 0.16 0.217* 
Slovakia 0.033 0.096 0.18 0.30 0.38 0.64 0.11 0.15 0.153* 
Slovenia 0.032 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.20 - 0.07 0.270 
Ukraine 0.036 0.10 0.22 0.38 0.47 0.72 0.17 0.15 -0.093* 
Source: Authors’ own calculation using Orbis data. 
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Table 3: Distribution of Excess leverage in the sample countries  
 
 All firms with debt>0 
 Proportion of firms with 
Excess leverage L-L*>0 
Average gap for firms with excess 
leverage 
Country Debt ratio Liability ratio Debt ratio Liability ratio 
Bulgaria 0.7575 0.7515 1.78 1.9079 
Croatia 0.8372 0.6977 2.32 1.1916 
Czech Republic 0.7789 0.8040 2.0477 1.2136 
Hungary 0.7955 0.7727 1.42 1.1009 
Latvia 0.8133 0.7867 1.7852 1.1360 
Poland 0.8541 0.7951 2.5587 1.1912 
Romania 0.5451 0.7490 3.787 1.2433 
Russia 0.8226 0.7776 2.1171 3.0655 
Serbia 0.7944 0.8026 2.89 1.2986 
Slovakia 0.7563 0.7632 1.94 1.7744 
Slovenia 0.6667 0.8519 1.2779 1.1706 
Ukraine 0.7392 0.7824 1.7866 1.2191 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation using Orbis data. 
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Table 4. Financial institutional in CEE countries 2001-2005 
 
COUNTRY 
[1] Size of 
the banking 
sector 
[1] Efficiency 
of the 
banking 
sector 
[1] 
Stability of 
the 
banking 
sector 
[1] Equity 
market 
efficiency 
[3] Market 
capitalization  
to GDP 
[2] 
Creditors’ 
rights 
[3] Share of 
foreign 
banks 
[3] Bank 
reform 
[3] 
Competition 
reform 
Bulgaria 4.84 5.51 4.64 6.68 8.74 2.00 77.34 3.40 2.38 
Croatia 5.76 4.89 4.42 NA 23.69 3.00 89.64 3.74 2.30 
Czech Republic 5.35 4.72 5.01 3.55 22.69 3.00 86.10 3.76 2.94 
Hungary 5.21 5.37 4.70 4.23 23.51 1.00 76.12 4.00 3.12 
Latvia 4.71 5.34 3.47 4.78 10.38 3.00 53.50 3.62 2.60 
Poland 5.07 5.67 5.04 5.03 20.77 1.00 72.00 3.38 3.06 
Romania 3.95 4.23 4.69 3.85 11.03 1.67 55.36 2.82 2.30 
Russian Federation 4.5 5.04 4.82 3.00 46.59 1.67 8.04 2.00 2.30 
Serbia NA 4.51 NA NA 10.17 2.00 36.46 2.12 1.00 
Slovakia 5.52 4.76 6.07 NA 7.84 2.00 90.54 3.46 3.12 
Slovenia 5.43 5.09 3.77 4.55 23.38 3.00 18.74 3.30 2.70 
Ukraine 4.49 4.68 2.05 NA 12.12 2.00 2.30 13.98 3.32 
[1]: Source: FSDI, World Bank. [2] Source: La Porta et al. [3] Source EBRD. 
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Table 5. Mean comparison of selected characteristics of firms with/without excess debt ratio 2001-2005  
 
 Liability ratio Debt ratio 
 L-L*>0 L-L*<0 T-stat L-L*>0 L-L*<0 T-stat 
Foreign 0.28 0.32 -2.507** 0.28 0.29 -0.310 
SME 0.51 0.48 1.983* 0.50 0.45 3.293*** 
Age 36.63 41.80 -4.832*** 37.87 41.08 -2.489** 
Log(total assets) 9.55 10.37 -12.982*** 9.55 10.2 -12.690** 
Fixed assets 0.55 0.53 3.675*** 0.55 0.53 2.646** 
Intangible assets (as a 
share of total assets) 
0.009 0.10 -0.581 0.009 0.10 -0.745 
Profitability EBITTA -0.27 0.045 -1.036 -0.27 0.045 -1.036 
Efficiency of the banking 
sector 
4.97 5.0 -1.412 4.97 5.04 -3.523*** 
Market capitalization 21.9 26.7 -8.960*** 21.9 29.2 -10.204*** 
Inflation rate 12.8 8.4 17.858*** 12.5 9.3 12.776** 
Note: There are no firms where actual leverage is equal to the optimal leverage. 
Foreign=1 if firm is foreign-owned; 0 otherwise.SME=1 if a firm is in quartiles 1 and 2 of the sample distribution of total assets and 0 
otherwise. Age: number of years since the firm was incorporated; Total assets are measured in USD thousands; fixed assets are 
measured in USD thousands. Intangible assets are the ratio of intangible fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is measured as the 
ratio of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) to total assets. Bank efficiency refers to the FSDI Index (1-5) of banking sector 
efficiency where a higher value means greater efficiency. Market capitalization rate is the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP (in %). 
Inflation refers to the CPI inflation (in %) 
Source: Authors’ own calculation using Orbis data. 
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Table 6. Determinants of Excess Leverage: Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Estimates  
 All firms Non-zero debt firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES EXCESSTD EXCESSTL EXCESSTD EXCESSTL 
Small & medium 
firms 
-0.0330 -0.0385 -0.0571 -0.0648 
 (0.0303) (0.0334) (0.0415) (0.0439) 
Age -0.151*** -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.127*** 
 (0.00690) (0.00760) (0.00905) (0.00957) 
Intangible assets 0.460 -0.103 0.556 -0.0151 
 (0.310) (0.342) (0.366) (0.387) 
Fixed assets 0.130** 0.000633 0.185** 0.00592 
 (0.0662) (0.0729) (0.0873) (0.0923) 
Profitability -0.0682* -0.176*** -0.124** -0.164*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0433) (0.0510) (0.0540) 
Bank efficiency -0.139*** -0.103*** -0.111*** -0.108*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0203) (0.0214) 
Market capitalisation -0.00261** -0.00253** 0.00165 -0.00265* 
 (0.00108) (0.00119) (0.00131) (0.00138) 
Inflation 0.00932*** 0.00457** 0.00288 0.00310 
 (0.00173) (0.00190) (0.00249) (0.00263) 
Constant 6.648*** 6.324*** 5.868*** 5.550*** 
 (0.254) (0.280) (0.294) (0.311) 
Observations 4534 4534 3084 3084 
Number of firms 1133 1133 915 915 
R-squared 0.327 0.301 0.279 0.276 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The dependent variable (Excesstd, Excesstl)  is equal to 1 if the firm has excess leverage (debt and liability ratio respectively) and 0 otherwise. See note to 
Table 5 for variable definitions. 
31 
 
 
Table 7. Threshold estimation of determinants of TFP growth (all firms)  
      
Variable (1) Coefficient t-statistic Variable (2) Coefficient t-statistic 
Initial TFP 0.126699 0.959595 Initial TFP 0.127223 0.960581 
TDTA>0.404 -0.024226 -3.21458** TLTA>0.412 -0.204268 -2.40342** 
0.322<TDTA<0.404 0.089215 2.930289** 0.348<TLTA<0.412 0.058413 1.915012* 
TDTA<0.322 0.350741 1.82689* TLTA<0.348 0.394431 2.36437** 
Small/Medium firms 0.143156 2.77914** Small/Medium firms 0.147616 2.88400** 
Young firms -3.34E-03 -0.077172 Young firms -6.97E-03 -0.161321 
Foreign firms 0.280277 1.38231 Foreign firms 0.295057 1.45004* 
Intangible assets -2.26983 -3.71606** Intangible assets -2.1469 -3.52047** 
Bank efficiency 0.095357 2.57299** Bank efficiency 0.092482 2.49775** 
Market capitalisation 0.010349 4.02834** Market capitalisation 0.010322 4.01593** 
Intercept 0.449349 1.60934* Intercept 0.365951 1.29955 
Sector Yes  Sector Yes  
R-square 0.042  R-square 0.039  
95% CI for γ 0.322-0.404  95% CI for γ 0.348-0.412  
 
Note: * denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes the same at 1% or lower level. See note to Table 5 for variable definitions. A firm is defined 
as young if it is incorporated in or after 1995.These estimates are based on data from 9 of the sample countries and exclude firms from Croatia, Romania and 
Serbia. This is because we could not find industry-level deflators for these countries and hence we could not calculate the TFP residuals.  
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Table 8. Threshold estimation of determinants of TFP growth (non-zero debt firms)  
 
 
 
 
Note: Note: * denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes the same at 1% or lower level. See notes to Table 5 and 7 for variable definitions. 
These estimates are based on data from 9 of the sample countries and exclude firms from Croatia, Romania and Serbia. This is because we could not find industry-
level deflators for these countries and hence we could not calculate the TFP residuals.  
 
 
 
Variable (1) Coefficient t-statistic Variable (2) Coefficient t-statistic 
Initial TFP 0.155852 1.06343 Initial TFP 0.168956 1.14858 
TDTA>0.399 -0.438213 -4.22543** TLTA>0.406 -0.279262 -5.21194** 
0.318<TDTA<0.399 0.088776 2.468972** 0.354<TLTA<0.406 0.084452 2.62755** 
TDTA<0.318 0.23567 3.118497** TLTA<0.406 0.585551 4.25187** 
Small/Medium firms 0.203393 3.64635** Small/Medium firms 0.202249 3.67908** 
Young firms -0.02566 -0.577607 Young firms -0.017047 -0.387835 
Foreign firms 0.421101 1.96136** Foreign firms 0.437864 2.03162** 
Intangible assets -1.79247 -2.86757** Intangible assets -1.6335 -2.64248** 
Bank efficiency 0.074301 1.87058* Bank efficiency 0.070297 1.79326* 
Market capitalisation 9.31E-03 3.35352** Market capitalisation 9.87E-03 3.59513** 
Intercept 0.409825 1.35935 Intercept 0.231641 0.766973 
Sector Yes  Sector Yes  
R-square 0.054  R-square 0.04  
95% CI for γ2 0.318-0.399  95% CI for γ2 0.354-0.406  
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Table 9. Threshold estimation of determinants of TFP growth for profitable and non-profitable firms with positive debt:  
 
 
 Firms with 
profit<0.04  
 Firms with 
profit >0.04  
 firms with 
ROCE<0.04  
Firms with 
ROCE 
>0.04  
         
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic
  
Initial TFP 0.0271 0.1513 0.2294 1.3229 0.0135 0.0755 0.2279 1.3169 
TDTA+ -0.5982 -3.0784** -0.0227 -3.2838** -0.7655 -4.187** -0.1421 -3.1335** 
TDTA= 0.5340 2.2141** -0.0531 -1.5035 -0.0043 -0.0094 0.1067 2.5672** 
TDTA- 0.2419 3.5171** 0.1596 2.1746 0.5536 2.0419** 0.2776 1.45586* 
Small/medium firms 0.11553 0.9091 0.1561 2.7733** 0.1223 2.9300** 0.1593 2.8338** 
YOUNG firms -0.2041 -1.7376* 0.0077 0.1814 -0.2084 -1.7157* 0.0076 0.1800 
FOREIGN firms 0.1367 0.5405 0.6022 2.4505** 0.1272 0.5062 0.5997 2.4458** 
Intangible assets -0.2763 -0.1099 -1.5836 -3.00466** 0.0953 0.0373 -1.7853 -3.3797** 
Bank efficiency 0.2745 2.2474** 0.039713 1.1451 0.2648 2.0524** 0.0381 1.0977 
Market 
capitalisation 
0.0097 1.0607 0.0088 3.56645** 0.00688 0.711086 0.0084 3.4425** 
Sector Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Intercept -0.4250 -0.7062 0.5280 1.5874* -0.2747 -0.4455 0.5668 1.7083* 
R-square 0.078  0.063  0.048  0.068  
threshold 0.224  0.577  0.425  0.522  
threshold range 0.187-
0.301  0.509-0.624  0.354-0.496  0.453-0.616  
Note:  These estimates use effects of debt ratio on TFP growth. * denotes significance at 10% or lower level while ‘**’ denotes the same at 1% or lower level. See 
note to Tables 5 and 7 for variable definitions. These estimates are based on data from 9 of the sample countries and exclude firms from Croatia, Romania and Serbia. This is 
because we could not find industry-level deflators for these countries and hence we could not calculate the TFP residuals. TDTA+, TLTA+ refer to values of leverage in excess of 
the upper threshold; TDTA=, TLTA= refer to the values of leverage between the upper and lower threshold while TDTA-, TLTA- refer to the values of leverage below the lower 
threshold. 
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Table 10. Percentage distribution of indebted firms with excess leverage   
 
 All non-zero debt firms 
Profitable non-zero debt firms 
(by profit margin) 
Non-profitable non-zero debt firms  
(by profit margin) 
Country Debt ratio γ2> 0.399 Debt ratio γ2> 0.577 debt ratio γ2>0.301 
Bulgaria 0.1657          0.0226 
0.0798 
Czech Republic 0.1055          0.0101 
0.0503 
Hungary 0.0455          0.0000 
0.0227 
Latvia 0.1733          0.0133 
0.0533 
Poland 0.0625          0.0069 
0.0104 
Russian Federation 0.1959          0.0348 
0.0365 
Slovakia 0.0322          0.0092 
0.0115 
Slovenia 0.00          0.0000 
0.000 
Ukraine 0.0864          0.0108 
0.0278 
 
Note:  These estimates make use of the threshold parameters obtained in Tables 8 (all non-zero debt firms) and 9 (profitable and non-profitable firms). 
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Table 11.  Inter-country variation in threshold estimates for debt and liability ratios: Selected estimates (95% confidence 
intervals between brackets) 
 (1)  (2) (3)  
   Debt ratio Liability ratio 
 Bank 
efficiency 
Market 
capitalization 
All firms Non-zero debt 
firms 
All firms Non-zero debt 
firms 
Bulgaria 5.51 8.74 0.354 (0.307, 0.387) 0.307 (0.288, 
0.367) 
0.354 (0.310, 0.366) 0.339 (0.269, 
0.384) 
Poland 5.07 20.77 0.409  (0.366, 0.437) 0.388 (0.344, 
0.441) 
0.399 (0.328, 0.451) 0.415 (0.377, 
0.463) 
Romania       
Russia 5.04 46.6 0.514 (0.439, 0.570) 0.529 (0.446, 
0.604) 
0.514 (0.491, 0.561) 0.547 (0.449, 
0.674) 
Serbia 4.51 10.2 0.288 (0.266, 0.344) 0.327 (0.276, 
0.388) 
0.347 (0.310, 0.397) 0.377 (0.354, 
0.406) 
Ukraine 4.68 12.12 0.461 (0.377, 0.503) 0.442 (0.394, 
0.505) 
0.439 (0.399, 0.488) 0.483 (0.450, 
0.509) 
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the average values of indices of bank efficiency and market capitalization. Column (3) shows the estimate of leverage 
threshold and also the lower and upper limits of the leverage threshold (in the parentheses) for debt and liability ratio for all firms as well as indebted 
firms only. 
36 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Growth of domestic credit to GDP in the CEE region 
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Figure 2. Distribution of TFP growth in sample countries 
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Note: List of countries: 1: Bulgaria; 3: Czech Republic; 4: Hungary; 5: Latvia; 6: Poland; 8: Russia; 10: Slovakia; 11: Slovenia;  
12: Ukraine. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1. First-stage fixed effects estimates of debt ratio 2001-2005  
 Bulgaria Croatia Czech Hungary Latvia Poland 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log assets 0.134*** 0.412 -0.0459 -0.474** -0.226 0.0428** 
 (0.0434) (0.440) (0.0609) (0.159) (0.228) (0.0216) 
Asset growth -0.0204 -0.435* 0.00247 0.192 -0.0433 -0.00424* 
 (0.0223) (0.200) (0.00236) (0.129) (0.109) (0.00243) 
age -0.0181 -0.0689 -0.0369 0.119* 0.0451 0.00190 
 (0.0142) (0.0994) (0.0291) (0.0445) (0.0346) (0.0143) 
fixed assets -0.224** 0.310 -0.122 0.362 -0.103 0.202* 
 (0.109) (0.790) (0.214) (0.503) (0.270) (0.117) 
intangible assets 0.135 -1.462 -2.624** -12.29** -0.647** 0.0377 
 (0.699) (2.311) (1.132) (3.264) (0.317) (0.349) 
profitability -0.844*** 0.0877 -0.0679 0.573 0.632 0.111 
 (0.0712) (0.699) (0.117) (0.408) (1.563) (0.0870) 
Shareholder’s funds 0.299*** -0.0263 0.733*** 0.628 -0.712 -0.0747 
 (0.0927) (0.478) (0.185) (0.674) (0.782) (0.0698) 
Industry_median 0.0682 0.663 0.269 0.0112 0.374 0.140 
 (0.0675) (0.561) (0.213) (0.771) (0.415) (0.122) 
inflation -0.00353 0.0295 0.0328 -0.00310 -0.00716 0.000275 
 (0.00533) (0.0838) (0.0202) (0.00841) (0.0162) (0.00666) 
Constant -0.101 -0.107 1.148 1.277 1.391 -0.230 
 (0.526) (2.818) (0.761) (1.212) (2.268) (0.433) 
Observations 332 37 89 22 30 204 
Number of firms 131 16 33 9 13 91 
R-squared 0.483 0.495 0.309 0.987 0.417 0.096 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all variables are lagged by one year. See note to Table 5 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table A1 (continued). First-stage fixed effects estimates of debt ratio 2001-2005 
 Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Log assets 7.92e-05 7.92e-05 0.000788 -0.00648 1.607* 0.0472** 
 (5.59e-05) (5.59e-05) (0.0314) (0.0422) (0.898) (0.0234) 
Asset growth -2.39e-05 -2.39e-05 0.0293 0.0231 0.396 -0.0137 
 (3.24e-05) (3.24e-05) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.165) (0.0126) 
age -5.34e-05 -5.34e-05 0.0180* 0.0386* -0.151 -0.00603 
 (0.000113) (0.000113) (0.0103) (0.0194) (0.144) (0.114) 
fixed assets -2.95e-05 -2.95e-05 0.0166 0.174* -2.227 -0.0346 
 (0.000135) (0.000135) (0.0618) (0.0877) (1.913) (0.0827) 
intangible assets -0.00212** -0.00212* 0.0965 -0.356 0.334 0.253 
 (0.00103) (0.00113) (0.162) (0.284) (4.698) (1.037) 
profitability -0.000125 -0.000125 0.0313 -0.105 1.530* 0.0432* 
 (0.000146) (0.000146) (0.0755) (0.0813) (0.788) (0.0223) 
Shareholder’s funds 6.78e-05 6.78e-05 -0.0512 0.00411 4.498** -0.00800 
 (8.74e-05) (8.74e-05) (0.0556) (0.00714) (2.165) (0.0645) 
Industry_median -0.00139*** -0.00139*** 0.129 -0.135 -1.959* -0.0646 
 (0.000348) (0.000348) (0.110) (0.204) (0.981) (0.109) 
inflation -8.85e-06 -8.85e-06 0.00218 0.00860 -0.00616 0.00320 
 (3.83e-05) (3.83e-05) (0.00247) (0.00525) (0.0440) (0.0273) 
Constant 0.00479* 0.00479* -0.697* -0.511 -10.59 -0.289 
 (0.00244) (0.00244) (0.365) (0.387) (5.794) (0.776) 
Observations 121 121 511 186 16 378 
Number of firms 43 43 177 80 6 127 
R-squared 0.260 0.260 0.086 0.096 0.971 0.054 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all variables are lagged by one year. See note to Table 5 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table A1 (continued). First-stage fixed effects estimates of liability ratio 2001-2005 
 Bulgaria Croatia Czech Hungary Latvia Poland 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log assets 0.148 0.0205 -0.00129 0.496*** -0.207 0.131** 
 (0.0956) (0.0540) (0.0510) (0.0920) (0.247) (0.0516) 
Asset growth -0.0257 -0.0402 0.00117 -0.161** 0.0115 -0.00148 
 (0.0497) (0.0388) (0.00201) (0.0565) (0.156) (0.00173) 
age 0.0363 0.0191 -0.0364 -0.142*** 0.0356 -0.0508*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0184) (0.0246) (0.0236) (0.0559) (0.0185) 
fixed assets -0.405* -0.0731 -0.149 0.114 -0.426 0.0596 
 (0.244) (0.113) (0.186) (0.222) (0.419) (0.103) 
intangible assets 0.369 -1.051 -2.969*** -10.28*** 1.261** 0.440 
 (1.570) (0.863) (0.928) (1.392) (0.622) (0.558) 
profitability -3.503*** 0.275* -0.0777 -1.675*** -0.620 -0.213*** 
 (0.155) (0.152) (0.0987) (0.195) (1.340) (0.0814) 
Shareholder’s funds 0.934*** -0.268** 1.027*** 2.086*** -0.441 0.391*** 
 (0.206) (0.107) (0.179) (0.322) (1.075) (0.113) 
Industry_median -0.0607 -0.0113 0.604*** 2.156*** -0.279 0.125 
 (0.0612) (0.132) (0.195) (0.213) (0.708) (0.111) 
inflation -0.0287** -0.0169 0.0169 -0.00286 0.000949 0.0174* 
 (0.0118) (0.0195) (0.0170) (0.00377) (0.0243) (0.0101) 
Constant -2.323** -0.690 0.596 -1.924** 2.014 1.418** 
 (1.154) (0.893) (0.671) (0.672) (2.624) (0.696) 
Observations 341 250 89 23 32 244 
Number of firms 132 88 33 10 13 101 
R-squared 0.732 0.142 0.480 0.993 0.402 0.144 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0; all variables are lagged by one year. See note to Table 5 for variable 
definitions. 
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Table A1(continued). First-stage fixed effects estimates of liability ratio 2001-2005 
 
 Romania Russia Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
       
Log assets 0.182** -0.0199 -0.0166 0.159*** 0.185 -0.0333 
 (0.0756) (0.0133) (0.0383) (0.0523) (0.181) (0.0358) 
Asset growth -0.0688 7.89e-05 0.00952 0.0644** 0.0338 0.00230 
 (0.0438) (6.41e-05) (0.0265) (0.0254) (0.0835) (0.0150) 
age -0.156 -0.00135 0.0731*** 0.00806 0.0675 0.0100 
 (0.151) (0.0103) (0.0128) (0.0228) (0.0520) (0.135) 
fixed assets -0.122 -0.151 -0.00113 0.512*** -0.0517 -0.0115 
 (0.184) (0.134) (0.0757) (0.108) (0.0770) (0.0971) 
intangible assets 2.242 0.00283 0.0168 -0.828** 1.426 -0.642 
 (2.491) (1.150) (0.198) (0.333) (1.204) (1.236) 
profitability -0.807*** 0.0274 -0.126 -0.353*** 0.755 0.0301 
 (0.202) (0.123) (0.0924) (0.0963) (0.545) (0.0976) 
Shareholder’s funds 0.182 0.120* -0.134* -0.115 0.172 -0.309*** 
 (0.150) (0.0625) (0.0724) (0.0846) (0.310) (0.0832) 
Industry_median -0.144 0.290** 0.122 -0.0375 -0.158 -0.00537 
 (0.160) (0.126) (0.109) (0.0856) (0.176) (0.0876) 
inflation -0.0358 -0.00959 -0.00714** 0.000667 0.0428 -5.60e-05 
 (0.0511) (0.00621) (0.00304) (0.00614) (0.0331) (0.0323) 
Constant 1.873 115.1*** -2.587*** -1.003* -6.455 0.906 
 (3.255) (0.426) (0.449) (0.512) (3.872) (0.917) 
Observations 121 426 511 186 60 378 
Number of firms 43 170 177 80 21 127 
R-squared 0.267 0.054 0.265 0.620 0.474 0.105 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; all variables are lagged by one year. See note to Table 5 for variable 
definitions. 
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 Table A2. Incidence of Excess Leverage in East Asia 1995-2002 
 
Countries % of firms with excess leverage 
i.e., debt ratio > own optimal debt ratio  
Indonesia 43.6 
Korea 42.3 
Malaysia 42.5 
Thailand 45 
Mean for the worst affected countries 43.4 
Hong Kong 19.5 
Singapore 21 
Taiwan 24.9 
Mean for the least affected countries 21.8 
 
Source: Driffield and Pal (2010).  
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Table A3.  Further robustness checks of threshold estimates  
Case 1 
Firm size 
All larger firms All indebted larger 
firms  
 All larger firms All indebted larger 
firms  
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficien
t 
t-statistic Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficie
nt 
t-statistic
TDTA+ -0.0215 -3.8615 -0.4616 -4.6344 TLTA+ -0.231 -2.517 -0.3242 -5.6294 
TDTA= 0.0845 3.2176 0.0874 2.7003 TLTA= 0.0697 1.8198 0.0945 2.9145 
TDTA- 0.3421 1.9773 0.2142 3.3905 TLTA- 0.4495 2.3502 0.5741 4.7187 
95% CI to 
threshold 
0.317-0.334 0.321-0.403 95% CI 
to 
threshold
0.337-0.407 0.361-0.399 
Case 2 
Intangibles 
All firms with high 
intangibles 
All indebted firms 
with high 
intangibles 
 All firms with high 
intangibles 
All indebted firms 
with high 
intangibles 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficien
t 
t-statistic Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficie
nt 
t-statistic
TDTA+ -0.0251 -3.0788 -0.4531 -3.71 TLTA+ -0.2003 -2.3491 -0.2632 -6.2404 
TDTA= 0.1043 2.7073 0.0853 2.1686 TLTA= 0.0631 1.8018 0.0809 2.9414 
TDTA- 0.3586 1.5929 0.2615 3.1402 TLTA- 0.3544 2.785 0.6861 4.8787 
95% CI to 
threshold 
0.458-0.504 0.364-0.447 95% CI 
to 
threshold
0.401-0.442 0.392-0.426 
  
Note. TDTA refers to debt ratio while TLTA refers to liability ratio. TDTA+, TLTA+ refer to values of leverage in excess of the upper 
threshold; TDTA=, TLTA= refer to the values of leverage between the upper and lower threshold while TDTA-, TLTA- refer to the 
values of leverage below the lower threshold. CI refers to confidence interval. Other control variables are same as in Table 7.
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Appendix 2 
 
Calculation of TFP 
 
The approach and methodology are well developed and adopted from the existing literature (see e.g., Griffith 1999). This essentially 
involves estimating the following basic production function: 
 
  (A1) 
 
where subscripts i, t refer to firm and year; yit, kit, lit, and mit represent the logarithm of a firm’s output (sales) and the production 
inputs: capital (measured as the book value of fixed assets), labour (number of employees) and material costs respectively. We 
estimate it  from (1) as TFP and then determine the log(TFP). To deflate monetary values we use the appropriate producer price index 
for each manufacturing industry and consumer price index for services available from EU-KLMS (Gottingen) and also WWII 
(Vienna).  
One of the most common econometric problems with the estimation of TFP concerns endogeneity, when regressors and the 
error terms become correlated. This is because at least a part of the TFP will be observed by the firm at a time early enough so as to 
allow the firm to change the factor input decision. If that is the case, then profit maximization implies that the realisation of the error 
term is expected to influence the decision on factor inputs. Consequently the OLS estimates could turn out to be inconsistent. As an 
alternative we use Levinsohn-Petrin correction, who extend Olley and Pakes (1996) approach by using material inputs as a proxy to 
control for unobservable productivity shocks, as it is more common for firms to register material costs every year. Accordingly, we 
generate two series TFP and TFP_LP using the standard and Levinsohn-Petrin methods respectively, although TFP_LP remains our 
preferred measure. 
 
